Command-and-control, emergency powers, and the failure to observe United Nations disaster management principles following the 2009 L'Aquila earthquake by Imperiale, Angelo J. & Vanclay, Frank
  
 University of Groningen
Command-and-control, emergency powers, and the failure to observe United Nations disaster
management principles following the 2009 L'Aquila earthquake
Imperiale, Angelo J.; Vanclay, Frank
Published in:
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction
DOI:
10.1016/j.ijdrr.2019.101099
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2019
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Imperiale, A. J., & Vanclay, F. (2019). Command-and-control, emergency powers, and the failure to
observe United Nations disaster management principles following the 2009 L'Aquila earthquake.
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 36, [101099]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2019.101099
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 13-11-2019
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ijdrr
Command-and-control, emergency powers, and the failure to observe United
Nations disaster management principles following the 2009 L'Aquila
earthquake
Angelo J. Imperiale∗, Frank Vanclay
Department of Cultural Geography, Faculty of Spatial Science, University of Groningen, Netherlands
A R T I C L E I N F O
Keywords:
Disaster risk reduction





A B S T R A C T
Using the disaster risk reduction paradigm and United Nations principles for post-disaster interventions, we
analyse the actions of the Italian civil protection agency following the April 2009 earthquake in L'Aquila
(Abruzzo, Italy), especially the use of a command-and-control approach and emergency powers. We consider the
immediate response, the militarization of the emergency area, the establishment of red zones, the provision of
emergency shelter and temporary housing, and the utilisation of disaster myths. We discuss the failure of the
command-and-control approach to respect internationally-agreed principles of disaster risk reduction. The tra-
gedy and multidimensionality of disaster impacts should induce disaster agencies to carefully consider the social
dimensions of disaster in planning interventions. We found, however, that decision makers often adopt a
‘command-and-control’ approach and rely on emergency powers. These institutional arrangements mean disaster
agencies implement top-down planning without transparency or accountability. There is no systematic approach
to disaster risk reduction, community empowerment or resilience building. Post-disaster interventions are in-
fluenced by myths and misconceptions, and do not acknowledge the social dimensions of disasters. They increase
dependency on external support, annihilate the potentialities of local communities, create further environmental
and social impacts, violate human rights, while worsening vulnerabilities and risks. All this facilitates disaster
capitalism and corruption, ultimately resulting into a second disaster.
1. Introduction
Various international declarations [1–4,95,96] have contributed to
the evolution of a disaster risk reduction (DRR) paradigm that should be
the basis of disaster management in all countries. As currently under-
stood, this paradigm advocates building community resilience and
supporting local communities to reduce local vulnerabilities and en-
hance capacities to better manage disaster risks and impacts before and
after disasters. Good governance, the inclusive non-discriminatory
participation of affected peoples, respect for human rights, considera-
tion of environmental and social impacts of disaster interventions, and
accountability and transparency, are all required to achieve desired
DRR outcomes [2,3,5,6]. While this is widely accepted in disaster stu-
dies, there is little awareness of the DRR paradigm in much current
disaster management practice [7]. As we discuss in this paper, post-
disaster interventions continue to be implemented by national disaster
agencies and international organizations using emergency powers, the
command-and-control approach, and top-down planning. These
institutional arrangements are controversial and undermine achieve-
ment of DRR outcomes. We discuss how these institutional arrange-
ments played out following the April 2009 L'Aquila (Abruzzo, Italy)
earthquake, and establish that DRR principles were not observed during
recovery operations.
In order to support local communities affected by disaster, local and
national governments (or their disaster response organizations) and
international disaster management organizations have the critical task
of planning, implementing and managing post-disaster interventions.
However, instead of conforming with the DRR paradigm and United
Nations (UN) recommendations, the complexities involved often lead
them to take a command-and-control approach to disaster manage-
ment. The command-and-control approach has its roots in military
theory [8–14]. In essence, it means the exercise of authority through a
hierarchical chain of command emanating from a commanding officer
[15]. In disaster management circles, it means more than this, it is an
overarching worldview (or way of thinking) about post-disaster con-
texts and how disaster management should be implemented. Drawing
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on a range of official sources [15–18], the key elements of this world-
view can be described as follows. The complexity and chaos of disaster
mean that regimented action is needed. Time is of the essence. A strong
commander must take charge, and have a clear and unsaying vision of
what needs to be done. To avoid decision paralysis, pre-defined schema
and pre-determined action plans are implemented. The commander's
plan must be clear and simple and effectively communicated down the
ranks. Compliance must be enforced and there is no room for dissen-
tion. The affected community are overly-emotional, unprepared and
untrained, and their autonomous behaviour is a threat to themselves
and the wider community. They are not capable of providing useful
knowledge or contributing to recovery operations. Feedback is unreli-
able and therefore should be ignored, and no interference to the plan
can be tolerated. The deprivation of the liberty of local people is jus-
tified by the situation. Disaster management officers and volunteers are
heroes who are saving people and property.
Although considered positively by many disaster management
agencies, the command-and-control approach has been described as
‘chaos-command-and-control’ to imply that disasters are perceived by
many agencies as situations of chaos that need to be controlled
[12,14,19,20]. The approach has been criticized as being strict, rigid
and centralised, with the potential to obliterate community resilience,
extinguish community initiatives, and annihilate the capacities of local
communities [14,20–22]. It rests on a set of myths and misconceptions
that support its worldview, and leads to distorted outcomes [20,23,24].
A key critique is the failure of the approach to recognise the social
dimensions of disaster and of post-disaster interventions. [25,26].
Drawing on the sociology of disasters [10–13], we define the social
dimensions of disaster as comprising: the local social conditions (i.e.
social vulnerabilities and risks) that contribute to the disaster hap-
pening; the social impacts on affected local communities; the social
development goals that should be addressed through post-disaster in-
terventions; and the social change processes that should be enacted in
order to meet local people's needs, perceptions, desires and capacities,
and engage and strengthen local community resilience.
Arguably, the command-and-control approach has taken hold in
disaster agencies because most disaster management agencies have
their origins in the military, and because of the ongoing high level of
responsibility most countries accord for disaster management to mili-
tary and para-military forces [27,28]. This has led to disasters being
interpreted through a ‘war approach’ paradigm, and it being com-
monplace to use military concepts to discuss disasters [29]. This has led
to the externalisation of disasters, with disasters being considered as
external events and even as animistic, supra-natural forces [97]. A
disaster is conceived as an enemy that is threatening community
wellbeing and must be defeated, and from which local communities
must be defended or protected. Thus, disaster response and emergency
management must be organised through a precise chain of command
that guarantees rapid response, efficiency, and success in defeating the
enemy.
Over time, the command-and-control approach has been transferred
to other domains including coalitions of governments (e.g. NATO), the
expropriation of land for large infrastructure projects, and civil pro-
tection, humanitarian and peacekeeping operations [16,30–33]. New
word constructions have been introduced, including ‘consultation,
command and control’, and the scope of the approach has been ex-
panded to include the role of political, military and civil authorities in
political strategizing, crisis management, civil emergency planning, and
in implementing critical infrastructure [17]. In general, the switch from
civil defence to civil protection arrangements was not accompanied by
any real intention to meet international DRR guidelines or develop ef-
fective community empowerment strategies to enhance the resilience of
people and places at risk [34]. Despite these developments, the fun-
damental nature of the command-and-control approach adopted also by
civil protection systems has not changed.
In a disaster context, the command-and-control approach is enacted
and legitimated by the declaration of a ‘State of Emergency’. In most
countries, including Italy, once a State of Emergency is declared, dis-
aster management agencies operate as agents (surrogates, delegates) of
the state (i.e. the national government), are granted emergency powers,
and are typically covered by state secrecy provisions. Emergency
powers are “special prerogatives that a government or a president can
resort to in extraordinary situations such as war, insurgency, terrorist
attacks, or other severe threats to the state, environmental calamities,
serious industrial accidents, pandemics or similar situations that
threaten a great number of lives” [35](p.6). With many countries
having minimal specification of the conditions governing emergency
rule in their legal frameworks, various concerns have arisen in relation
to the exercise of emergency powers [35,36]. This is especially because
a State of Emergency allows for “derogations from both human rights
standards and alterations in the distribution of functions and powers
among the different organs of the State” [36](p.3). The suspension of
proper procedure and governance oversight means that there is high
potential for improper actions (rent seeking, elite capture and corrup-
tion) in post-disaster contexts [37].
By reviewing international DRR principles and guidelines [1,2,4,5],
we critique the use of emergency powers, the command-and-control
approach and top-down planning used by the Italian Department of
Civil Protection (DCP) in the recovery operations following the 6 April
2009 earthquake in the Abruzzo Region of Italy. We specifically con-
sider how the command-and-control approach was applied in relation
to the control of looting (jackals), the implementation of restricted
areas (red zones), and in the provision of emergency shelter and tem-
porary housing. We analyse how the top-down planning implemented
by the Italian Civil Protection through the use of emergency powers and
the adoption of the command-and-control approach facilitated elite
capture and disaster capitalism [38–40] at national level, did not reflect
local people's needs, priorities and desires, and ultimately represented
for local communities a second disaster in the mid and long-term.
2. International principles and guidelines for disaster
management
Although the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordi-
nator (UNDRO) was founded in the early 1970s, arguably the DRR
paradigm emerged with a 1982 report, Shelter After Disaster: Guidelines
for Assistance [4] and became firmly established with the UN Decade of
Natural Disaster Reduction in the 1990s. The 1982 UNDRO report was a
policy and guideline about emergency shelter and post-disaster
housing. It sought to address the mistakes of past interventions, espe-
cially those reported in relation to the 1976 earthquake in Guatemala,
which UNDRO considered were typical of many post-disaster inter-
ventions: “too much aid was given away; too many of the houses con-
structed were merely of an emergency type; some organizations used
large numbers of foreign volunteers; too much was done under pressure
and without proper consultation so that the victims became mere
spectators of the work carried out rather than participants; a lot of re-
construction work was undertaken without first consulting” [4] (1). The
report identified 14 principles that should be observed in post-disaster
interventions (see Table 1). Later revisions of the report largely main-
tained the original advice from 1982 [41,42].
Principle 7 of the 1982 UNDRO report recommended promoting
awareness of the need for more focus on reducing the risk of future
disasters and enhancing local preparedness. In response to this prin-
ciple, the UN declared the 1990s, the ‘Decade of Natural Disaster
Reduction’. Since then, disaster management thinking has been evol-
ving from a response-based war paradigm [29,97,98]; to a theoretical
approach that focusses on the social pre-conditions of disaster and on
building community resilience [5,6]. This shift was further promoted by
the 1994 Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World. Two
key messages of the Yokohama strategy were that “disaster response
alone is not sufficient, as it yields temporary results at a very high cost”
A.J. Imperiale and F. Vanclay International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 36 (2019) 101099
2
and that “disaster prevention, mitigation and preparedness are better
than disaster response” to achieve DRR and community resilience
outcomes at the local community level [1](p.4).
Since the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction in 1999, the
UN has advocated that DRR must be fully interlinked with social and
environmental development [8]. Disaster management thinking ex-
panded from mitigating disaster impacts after disasters, to also con-
sidering the reduction of social and environmental vulnerabilities and
risks, and enhancing local community resilience. Effective local com-
munity involvement became a key component of DRR and disaster risk
governance. International DRR thinking considered that it was crucial
that local communities play a pro-active role in enhancing DRR at the
local level.
The Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015 [2] argued that in-
creasing community resilience was crucial to enhance DRR and pre-
paredness, and that resilience should be integrated as a social devel-
opment goal in each disaster management phase, both before and after
disasters occur. The Hyogo report emphasised the need for more
“proactive measures, bearing in mind that the phases of relief, re-
habilitation and reconstruction following a disaster are windows of
opportunity for the rebuilding of livelihoods and for the planning and
the reconstruction of physical and socio-economic structures, in a way
that will build community resilience and reduce vulnerability to future
disaster risks” [2](p.5).
The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 [3]
remarked on the need for empowerment and inclusive, accessible and
non-discriminatory participation of all relevant stakeholders, including
local communities, academia, business and professional associations,
and financial institutions. It acknowledged that DRR can only be
achieved by paying special attention to people disproportionately af-
fected by disaster. It emphasised the need for “investing in the eco-
nomic, social, health, cultural and educational resilience of persons,
communities and countries and the environment” [3] (11). The Sendai
Framework considered the key priority areas to be: understanding risks;
strengthening disaster risk governance; investing in DRR for resilience;
and enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and to build
back better in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction. The Sendai
Framework indicated that the recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruc-
tion phases are opportunities to ‘Build Back Better’ through integrating
disaster risk reduction into development measures. Together with en-
hancing the resilience of communities, the UN recommends that post-
disaster operations be better incorporated into the sustainable devel-
opment of affected areas [3].
3. Methodology
This paper is part of a larger research project looking at the social
dimensions of the L'Aquila earthquake at each disaster management
phase. The overall project used a wide range of methods, including
action research, auto-ethnography, ethnography, participant
Table 1
The 14 basic principles of disaster management (synthesised from Ref. [4]].
Principles Description
1. Avoid anything best undertaken by survivors themselves. The primary resource in the provision of post-disaster shelter is the grass-roots motivation
of survivors, their friends and their families. Disaster relief agencies must avoid
duplicating anything best undertaken by the survivors themselves.
2. Support and strengthen local governance and capacities. The correct and logical distribution of roles is crucial. Local authorities are the best
qualified to decide who should do what, where and when. Rather than to usurp the role of
local bodies, the priority should be to support and strengthen local capacity.
3. The assessment of human needs is more important than any damage assessment. The rapid accurate assessment of survivors' needs is more important than a detailed
assessment of property damage.
4. The compulsory evacuation of survivors should be avoided. The compulsory evacuation of disaster survivors can retard the recovery process and cause
resentment, while facilitating the voluntary movement of survivors according to their own
needs, can result in positive outcomes.
5. Local content in building emergency shelters should be encouraged. Disaster relief agencies tend to give an excessive priority to the need for imported shelter
as a result of mistaken assumptions regarding the capacity of survivors, their resources
and priorities.
6. Reconstruction of damaged buildings should be a priority rather than a focus
only on temporary solutions.
The earlier the reconstruction process begins, the lower the ultimate social, economic and
capital costs of the disaster.
7. Preparedness is crucial to reduce post-disaster impacts. Post-disaster needs, including shelter requirements, can be anticipated with some
accuracy. Effective contingency planning can help to reduce distress and homelessness.
8. Reconstruction is an opportunity for risk reduction and reform. A disaster offers opportunities to reduce the risks of future disasters by introducing
improved land-use planning, building methods, and building regulations based on hazard,
vulnerability and risk analyses.
9. The relocation of communities, whether temporary or permanent, should be
avoided.
The relocation of people is rarely feasible or appropriate. Services may be missing, it
exacerbates harm and suffering, and prolongs recovery. If relocation is to be considered, it
must only be undertaken with the informed consent of the community, is close by, the
conditions are safe, the cost is reasonable, proximity to jobs, and services and utilities are
available.
10. Success in reconstruction is closely linked to issues of land tenure, government
land policy, and all aspects of land-use and infrastructure planning.
The land issue must be recognized as an integral part of post-disaster housing
programmes. Social, environmental and economic goals must be respected in post-disaster
interventions.
11. Cash donations and the creation of dependency should be avoided. Cash grants are only effective in the short-term, and can create a dependency relationship
between survivor and disaster relief agencies. It is advantageous for individuals and their
community to participate in the financing of their own reconstruction.
12. Avoid raising the expectations of affected local communities. It is important for disaster relief agencies not to exacerbate social and economic tensions
by raising expectations in relation to the type of replacement housing that is provided.
13. The success of post-disaster interventions strictly depends on accountability
and the participation of local people.
The most effective post-disaster interventions results from the participation of survivors in
determining their own needs and planning accordingly. The successful performance of
disaster relief agencies is thus dependent on their accountability to the recipients of their
aid.
14. Guidelines should be developed at the local level, by local people, modelled on
international guidelines.
Guidelines for post-disaster interventions should be developed at the local community
level, formulated by local personnel according to local conditions (types of risk, culture,
knowledge, economic base, social system). Such guidelines should be modelled on
international guidelines.
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observation, fieldwork discussions, fieldnotes, blogging, surveys im-
mediately following the 2009 earthquake, document analysis of all
relevant documents, a media analysis of reporting about the earthquake
and its aftermath; 37 in-depth interviews with key informants; and over
250 interviews with people in local communities undertaken between
2009 and 2018. This paper is primarily about the response and recovery
phases. It draws on participant observation in the tent camps in 2009,
the media analysis of reporting during the recovery and reconstruction
periods, and 14 formal, in-depth, retrospective interviews with key
informants conducted in 2012 and 2017.
The primary author is an Italian citizen who was resident in the
L'Aquila region for most of his life. He was present in L'Aquila city on
the night of the earthquake and lived in the L'Aquila mountain province
for the following seven years. As a young professional, he was well
integrated in the L'Aquila community. In the days after the earthquake,
as a reflexive scholar and practitioner, he began taking notes of his
experiences and of what he witnessed.
The retrospective interviews were conducted in 2017 with a range
of key local people who were ideal ‘key informants’ in that were
knowledgeable about what happened in the L'Aquila region after the
earthquake, and were willing to speak frankly with us. They included a
councillor from L'Aquila City Council, the Mayors of two mountain
villages, a lawyer representing the families of victims, three seismolo-
gists, and nine people who emerged as spokespersons for their various
communities. All had been affected by the command-and-control ap-
proach. They were identified by using the lead author's networks, and
by approaching people cited in the media. To avoid formulaic responses
and to focus on the consequences of disaster management on local
communities, it was deliberately decided not to interview people who
were highly associated with: the leading political parties; the key pro-
test movements; or the disaster management agencies. The interviews
were recorded and subsequently transcribed. Informed consent was
obtained for all formal interviews and general principles of ethical so-
cial research were observed [43]. Information was cross-checked (tri-
angulated) with other sources where possible. All interviews were done
in Italian. For this paper, extracts from the interviews were translated
into English by the primary author, with some adaptation by the native
English speaking co-author. In our translations, we have reflected the
intended or implied meaning as would be said in English, rather than
providing the exact literal translation.
4. The L’Aquila earthquake of 6 April 2009
The earthquake (6.3 Mw) devastated the regional capital, L'Aquila,
and 56 surrounding municipalities, killing 309 persons, injuring some
1,500 and rendering some 70,000 people homeless in the affected area,
which became known as ‘the crater’. The extent of damage meant that a
massive recovery operation was arguably necessary, and many elabo-
rate schemes were implemented in the recovery, reconstruction and
development phases [44,45].
A State of Emergency was declared immediately after the earth-
quake, and remained in force for three years, an extraordinary long
period [35,36,44,45]. A large number of emergency and military per-
sonnel was deployed. A huge contingent of the world's media arrived
and stayed for months. The government played to the media, including
by orchestrating a State Funeral on 10 April 2009, which was broadcast
nationally and internationally. The holding of the G8 summit in
L'Aquila in July 2009, which had been relocated by Prime Minister
Silvio Berlusconi from La Maddalena (Sardinia region) to L'Aquila at
short notice, was another act of mediatization [46], and intensified
militarization in the crater. Restricted areas (red zones) were estab-
lished almost immediately and were still in force after ten years, ex-
cluding people from the centres of L'Aquila and surrounding villages.
The recovery process has been severely criticised [44,45,47–50,99-
101], including by an European Parliament inquiry [51], which was
concerned about the misuse of the €493 million provided by the
European Union. The L'Aquila Prosecutor's Office, the National Anti-
Mafia Department (Direzione Nazionale Anti-Mafia, DNA) (DNA, 2016),
and the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry into the Mafia [52] have
also conducted inquiries into financial irregularities and mafia in-
volvement. These reports confirmed the infiltration of mafia in post-
disaster reconstruction in both public and private works. Since the
earthquake, there have been many legal actions relating to allegations
of fraud, corruption, bribery, inadequate public administration and
mafia infiltration [7,45]. Ten years after the earthquake, L'Aquila is still
a crater. The red zones are still in place, and over 10,000 people still
live in temporary accommodation.
5. The immediate response
The earthquake happened at 3.32 in the early morning of Monday 6
April 2009. Immediately, local people helped each other. The devas-
tation was extensive. Many buildings were damaged and public utilities
and services were disrupted. Local service personnel (fire, police, am-
bulance) spontaneously went to their command posts. Given the extent
of devastation, it did not take long for the authorities to realise there
was a major problem and a significant response would be needed. The
situation room of the Department of Civil Protection (DCP) in Rome
went into action, with the leaders of Italy's multiple police forces, army,
fire and other emergency services being called up (at 4.17), and the
emergency coordinating body, Unitá di Crisi S3, enacted. Emergency
services personnel from all over Italy were called up and sprang into
action. The timing of their arrival in L'Aquila largely depended on their
travel distance, which in many cases was within an hour or two.
At 7.17, it was announced that a State of Emergency would be de-
clared, and at 8.43 Prime Minister Berlusconi signed the official state-
ment, which was subsequently formalised [53]. Guido Bertolaso, the
Chief of the DCP, was appointed Delegated Commissioner of the Italian
Government (Commissario Delegato) and charged with providing all
forms of assistance and protection of the primary interests of the af-
fected population (ogni forma di assistenza e di tutela degli interessi pub-
blici primari delle popolazioni interessate), as well as appropriate mea-
sures to bring the emergency to an end (idonea al superamento del
contesto emergenziale) and to safeguard human lives (salvaguardia delle
vite umane) (art.1, subpara.2, DPCM 6-4-2009). Later that day, Berlus-
coni appointed the Chief of the Italian Secret Services, Franco Gabrielli,
as the new Prefect (representative of the national government) for the
Province of L'Aquila (replacing Aurelio Cozzani who had retired a few
days earlier). The Chief of the National Police, Antonio Manganelli, was
also given the responsibilities of Chief of the local police.
Because most official buildings in L'Aquila were severely damaged,
some senior DCP staff did a quick aerial survey by helicopter shortly
after dawn (around 6.15) to assess which buildings were intact and
could be used to house a local coordination centre. They decided that
the most suitable building to use was the Italian Finance Police (IFP)
school in Coppito, a suburb 5 kms from the centre. The local radio
station played an important role in local communications. Local public
officials and civic-minded individuals realised that they would need to
coordinate and travelled to L'Aquila, being informed by radio that they
should go to the IFP building [22].
The Minister for the Interior, who was also responsible for emer-
gency services, Roberto Maroni, together with Manganelli, travelled to
L'Aquila from Milan, arriving around midday. As soon as they arrived,
Maroni announced that 1,500 fire officers and 200 police officers had
been dispatched and that, in order to ensure efficient rostering, around
12,000 fire officers would be utilised. That evening on TV, the Minister
for Defence, Ignazio La Russa, declared that arrangements had been
made to ensure 1,000 military personnel would be present in L'Aquila at
any time, and that over 3,000 would be deployed to ensure adequate
rostering. Within 48 h of the earthquake, over 10,000 rescuers had re-
gistered as being present in L'Aquila, including volunteers and per-
sonnel from the fire service, police and army. By the end of April, a total
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of 17,000 external service persons had visited L'Aquila [102]. By the
end of August, the number had reached over 100,000 volunteers, pri-
marily coming from other regions of Italy [54].
To facilitate coordination of the emergency, the DCP established a
command unit called Direzione di Comando e Controllo (DICOMAC)
(Directorate of Command and Control). According to DCP's online
glossary [55], DICOMAC is a coordination unit for the operational
components and structures necessary for civil protection, which is en-
acted in an affected area when considered necessary by the DCP in si-
tuations of a national emergency. Although DICOMAC was mentioned
in Italian Disaster Management manual, which is known as Il Metodo
Augustus (the Augustus Method) [18], it was likely first implemented
with the 2009 L'Aquila earthquake. However, rather than being a co-
ordination mechanism addressed to restore and support local govern-
ance functions, DICOMAC replaces or substitutes them. In this way,
DICOMAC became the extraordinary government of the crater [22]. In
L'Aquila, DICOMAC was internally structured according to its opera-
tional functions and by 7 geographically-dispersed centres of command
called COMs. The COMs were led by civil protection personnel with the
primary objective of managing emergency shelter. By 11 April 2009,
some 170 tent camps had been established.
The rapid response of the emergency services is a feature of the
command-and-control approach, and arguably one of its strengths [56].
However, the success of emergency response largely depends on and
responds to bottom-up information from local people about what ac-
tions are needed and where assistance is required. The disaster studies
literature reports that, even in times of extreme urgency, “average ci-
tizens, victims' friends, family, and neighbours perform the majority of
search and rescue in the initial minutes and hours of a disaster. These
people locate victims by listening for calls for help, watching for other
signs of life, and using information to estimate where the trapped
person may be” [8] (328). In L'Aquila, the many people who escaped
unscathed went around providing help wherever they could, locating
victims, helping each other and organizing themselves to rescue other
people [22,103]. These collective actions were a major part of the
search and rescue effort.
The State of Emergency accorded the DCP with emergency powers,
specifically the power of injunction (i.e. to issue ordinances on behalf of
the government) and the power of exception (i.e. derogation of or-
dinary rules and requirements, in effect giving the DCP the ability to act
unilaterally). All actions, including emergency shelter and temporary
housing provision, were carried out in the absence of ordinary restric-
tions and controls, and in disregard of all norms usually applied to
public administration, including those relating to contracts, out-
sourcing, public procurement and prevention from mafia infiltration
(art.3, OPCM n.3753). The DCP also had access to the Civil Protection
Fund, giving it relatively unrestricted access to funding.
6. The jackals alert and other looters
During the morning of 6 April 2009, a SkyTG24 journalist inter-
viewed the National Police Chief Manganelli by phone while he was
travelling by car to L'Aquila. Even before arriving in L'Aquila, he said
that he was already thinking about what measures to implement against
‘jackals’. By jackals, he meant looters, which in his mind was a typical
occurrence following disasters.
Technically, jackals are opportunistic omnivores of the dog family
(genus Canis), which roam in groups and survive by scavenging.
Although there is much classic mythology about jackals, (especially
Egyptian mythology, for example the god, Anubis, who is the protector
of graves and the guide of souls), in contemporary times jackals are
associated with roving gangs of thieves or louts. In Italian, the word,
sciacallo (jackal), means an unscrupulous person who steals goods from
other people's properties and/or turns other people's tragedies into their
own advantage. Sciacallaggio (jackalism, looting) refers to this oppor-
tunistic behaviour.
Soon after his arrival in L'Aquila, Manganelli immediately issued a
press release to say that the first thing he saw on his arrival to the new
temporary police station was the first people to be arrested for looting.
This message was released by the national press agency (ANSA) at
15.09 [57], and it was published online by several national newspapers.
At 15.47, this news was amplified by the President of the L'Aquila
Province, Stefania Pezzopane, who said: “There are jackals around,
even within a few minutes of the earthquake they were already looting”
[58].
The next morning (7 April), in a clear snub to Manganelli, the
Finance Police, which had responsibility for night-time monitoring of
the city centre, issued a press release saying there had been no looting
during the night [59]. Despite this, and notwithstanding that there had
been no mention of looting in any news or police report during 7 April,
the DCP issued a press release at 10.19 on 8 April saying: “Jackals are
arriving from all over Italy” [57]. Later that day, two men were arrested
for looting, which was widely publicised. At 18.43, however, they were
declared innocent and it was accepted that they were inhabitants going
back to their own houses to extract their own possessions from the
rubble. Messages in the media were misleading: they rarely acknowl-
edged the two people were innocent.
The position of the Italian government was that looting was a matter
of major concern. It promulgated alarm about looting in order to in-
troduce a suite of measures including: the militarization of the emer-
gency area, with a large deployment of soldiers; the establishment of
red zones; the coordination of ‘hunting packs’, i.e. squads of police who
patrol the emergency area (with over 500 police being deployed for this
purpose, in squads of 30 [60]; the introduction of a new crime, scia-
callaggio (looting), with severe penalties; a fast track procedure to hear
alleged looting offences; and new powers to the DCP so that they could
expel people from the crater. It was considered that all this was justi-
fiable in order to make people feel comfortable while leaving their
homes and belongings behind when they were sent to emergency ac-
commodation.
Immediately after the State Funeral (10 April), Prime Minister
Berlusconi gave an interview in which he said, amongst other things,
that 4 people were arrested that day for looting and that they would
stand trial the same day as a result of the new fast track procedure. He
also said that 700 police officers had already been deployed to prevent
further looting [61]. As it happened, at the fast-track trial, these four
people were declared innocent.
In DRR circles, looting is regarded as one of the disaster myths ra-
ther than being a reality. While instances of looting are frequently re-
ported in the media, considered analysis generally finds that instances
of looting are rare, especially in the immediate aftermath of a disaster,
and that those charged with looting are usually ordinary people le-
gitimately going about their own business [20,23,62–68].
We interviewed two police officers (in 2017) who had been based in
L'Aquila in 2009. In stark contrast to the official story about looting,
these police officers told us that there were no jackals during the night
of the earthquake, nor during the days afterwards. Even in the months
following the disaster, only a few cases of looting were registered, most
of which were false alarms.
A journalist with the newspaper, La Repubblica, Meo Ponte, ac-
companied the Carabinieri police while they were supposedly hunting
jackals. From his accounts [60], we can read that the city centre was a
‘ghost city’, that there were no jackals, and that the only people stopped
were local inhabitants going to their own homes. The police officer
coordinating the hunting pack said: “We have never had a major pro-
blem with crime … this is a city with a low crime index, some problems
related to drug use by the university students, some robberies made by
itinerant criminals, some family quarrels, that's all, nothing more. The
local population has always cooperated with us. Here, they all know
each other and a new face is easily recognizable.” Ponte concluded his
story saying that there was not even a shadow of a jackal.
Actually, on the morning of the earthquake there were many
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unscrupulous characters ready to turn the L'Aquila tragedy to their own
advantage. They were not that kind of jackal conceived by the DCP,
they were influential entrepreneurs in the building industry. The night
of the earthquake, they were not digging in the rubble to steal goods
from damaged houses, they were lying comfortably in their beds in
their mansions, hundreds of kilometres away, laughing and thinking
about the great business opportunities the earthquake presented, cer-
tain they would be appointed to reconstruct the crater. This was clearly
illustrated in a phone call at 15.34 on the day of the earthquake be-
tween two construction entrepreneurs, Pierfrancesco Gagliardi and his
brother-in-law, Francesco Piscicelli, who had links to the government
taskforce for the management of big events (Struttura di Missione per gli
anniversari di interessi nazionali, which is known in Italy as the
Ferratella). This phone call was published online by the national
newspaper, Libero, on 11 February 2010 (slightly modified, author
translation and interpretation) (the audio recording is available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WPyzHIP5huA).
Gagliardi: You, in the Ferratella, should be interested in this earth-
quake, because [to get full benefit out of this opportunity] we need
to start in top gear immediately. There is not an earthquake ev-
eryday!
Piscicelli: [laughing] No. There isn't, I know.
Gagliardi: [laughing] Oh, for heaven's sake, poor people.
Piscicelli: Okay, bye.
Gagliardi: [laughing] You understand, don't you? [what needs to be
done to cash in]
Piscicelli: [laughing] Yeah, sure, I was laughing this morning at 3.30
in bed.
Gagliardi: [laughing] Yeah, me too. Okay, ciao.
Piscicelli: Ciao.
This recording was important in that it led to the uncovering of a
network of criminal entrepreneurs with strong links to the government
and the DCP. With this recording, prosecutors examining the awarding
of contracts associated with the G8 summit could apply leverage to
Gagliardi and Piscicelli, which led to them giving evidence about others
in the ring. Significant identities were subsequently charged for crimes
against the public administration, including: Guido Bertolaso (the DCP
Chief), Diego and Daniele Anemone (noted entrepreneurs), Angelo
Balducci (President of the Public Works Superior Council), Francesco
Pittorru (retired General of the Finance Police, and former intelligence
agent), Fabio De Santis (Superintendent of Public Works for the
Tuscany Region), Riccardo Fusi (a building entrepreneur from Prato,
Tuscany region) and Denis Verdini (politician). Although, Bertolaso was
acquitted, and the legal action against Verdini and Daniele Anemone
expired (statue-barred), the others were sentenced to several years in
jail. Despite Bertolaso's acquittal, evidence of his association with
Anemone was well established [69].
With the publication of the phone call, a Facebook group called
Quelli che a L'Aquila alle 3.32 non ridevano (those who were in L'Aquila
at 3.32 did not laugh) was established as a protest of indignation, with
over 3,000 people signing up within 24 h. The group functioned as a
sharing space where local people wrote about what they were doing on
the night of the earthquake and about their concerns regarding the
ongoing saga of the recovery process. It also worked as a platform for
sharing news and information about events. For example, a demon-
stration was held in the L'Aquila city centre on 14 February 2010 to
protest about the exclusion of people from the city centre and the slow
process of reconstruction. About 300 people participated in the rally
and the symbolic act of breaking-through the barriers of the red zone.
As a way to advocate for participatory reconstruction, each protestor
symbolically took a stone or brick from the rubble. The rally gained a
lot of media exposure, including a YouTube video by a local filmmaker,
Luca Cococetta, called L'Aquila è nostra (L'Aquila is ours) [70]. This
protest led to further demonstrations, including one held two weeks
later, which attracted 2,000 participants, and to a movement called Il
popolo delle carriole (People of the Wheelbarrows) [46]. The expression,
Io non ridevo (‘I was not laughing’ or ‘I did not laugh’) became the battle
cry of a wider thinking that criticizes opportunism and corruption in
post-disaster situations [46].
7. Militarization and the creation of red zones
The deployment of thousands of fire, police, emergency and military
personnel in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake reflected the
Italian Government's strategy to ensure and demonstrate the response
would be a success [44]. During the days and months following the
earthquake, the L'Aquila landscape was dominated by the presence of a
large number of people in uniform or hi-vis clothing, as well as a large
number of emergency, police and military vehicles. The presence of
military and para-military forces drastically increased during the G8,
when even more severe restrictions and surveillance mechanisms were
imposed. Many local people felt that they had been besieged, and this
feeling was exacerbated by the militaristic approach implemented by
the DCP in the tent camps. The DCP initially called the tent camps ‘aree
di ricovero’ (recovery areas), although ‘campi base’ (basecamp), a mili-
tary term, became widely used. They were renamed ‘aree di accoglienza’
(i.e. welcome areas) for the G8 summit, although this term was seldom
used by the inhabitants.
The militarization of the crater contributed to creating an unbear-
able environment. As one local person said:
“The most terrifying feeling I had … was that L'Aquila absolutely
seemed like a post-war setting rather than a post-earthquake terri-
tory. The most devastating characteristic was the total militarization
– in that it dominated everything, the continued demand for iden-
tification documents, the very strong limitations on the movement
of local people, and a very extensive control over the whole terri-
tory. These measures did not have any justifiable reason given that
there was just an earthquake. I do not want to diminish the event,
but I ask: Why should an earthquake generate such a mass control
mechanism on the local affected population? … There were continued
identification checks, and police and military checkpoints every-
where … They asked you thousands of questions … They did not
allow you to get in the basecamps where your friends were. … While
the DCP's written ordinances … were raining down, many non-
written ordinances were raining down too, …such as, you can't go
there, you can't do this, you can't bring that. In such a situation, you
would often experience their arbitrariness. You could ask: Who said
that? Where is it written? To whom can I object? [but you would never
get an answer.] The pervasiveness of all this control left me stunned.
As I said before, there was an earthquake, there wasn't a civil war
such that you had to make some of the population responsible for
the conflict and put them in open air prison camps!”
On 8 April 2009, the L'Aquila Mayor declared that, for public safety
reasons, he had decided to shut down the city centre because of the risk
of building collapse and looting. By creating exclusion zones (known as
‘red zones’), the Mayor's ordinance n.73 banned public access to the
L'Aquila city centre. Other ordinances established red zones in all vil-
lages in the crater. The red zones were implemented promptly. Initially,
military personnel patrolled the perimeters, but within a few days, high
fences were erected. For several years, platoons of armed soldiers
maintained constant vigil in the red zones. No unauthorized persons
were permitted to enter without being accompanied. Officers were
available to accompany people who needed to go to their houses to
obtain essential belongings. However, all this contributed to the wor-
sening disaffection of local inhabitants and their sense of alienation and
disenfranchisement.
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While people were locked out from the historical city centres, many
private building firms were carrying out interventions on public and
private buildings in the red zones, including demolitions and shoring-
up solutions. These measures were implemented under emergency
procedures, without any engagement of local homeowners, and through
direct assignments rather than following ordinary procedures. They
were directly managed by the mayors and the technical directors of the
local municipalities, who had been assigned the same extraordinary
powers as the DCP. The State of Emergency lasted for three years, but
certain decisions taken under this regime (e.g. about demolitions and
safety measures) continued to be implemented for years afterwards
through the same extraordinary procedures. Notwithstanding the
militarization of the crater, there was a lack of monitoring of the im-
plementation of safety measures, widespread corruption, and scandals
around the shoring-up solutions and direct assignments.
The presence of the military was justified by the apparent need to
make local people feel protected from the supposed risk of jackals.
Among the first statements Prime Minister Berlusconi made after the
earthquake was a paternalistic message that the State sympathized with
the earthquake victims, that local people could leave the area and go on
holidays to hotels along the Adriatic coast, with the army being present
to protect their houses and belongings [71].
Politicians often consider that deploying the army is a way to dis-
play that they are taking charge in complex situations. However, by all
accounts, the extent of the presence of the army in L'Aquila was ex-
cessive [44,45,72,104]; and visitors to L'Aquila considered that the
military presence was absurd. Why were they there? They were cer-
tainly not there to protect people or property from jackals, but only as a
display of power for political advantage. Arguably, the high visibility of
state intervention in the immediate response functioned to disguise the
lack of effort in preparedness and to thwart demands for reflection on
institutional responsibilities. The heavy-handed use of military troops
together with other command-and-control tactics meant that local
people were locked out of their homes and their city or village for years,
leading to homelessness and a loss of their sense of place. Conversely,
building firms were left to conduct their business in the red zones un-
checked and unsupervised.
8. Emergency shelter, evacuation, eviction
The extent of devastation quickly became apparent after sunrise on
the morning of the earthquake. Over 30,000 buildings had been da-
maged, and around 70,000 people were homeless. By the afternoon of
the 6 April, the DCP had identified a number of places (including
sporting fields) where people could find refuge. The DCP started es-
tablishing tent camps at these locations, but the demand was great. On
the night of 6 April (the evening after the earthquake) and for several
nights following many people slept in their cars, caravans or other
makeshift arrangements. Some 600 people slept in train carriages,
which were made available by the Italian Railway Network at the
nearby railway station. Some people with second houses or relatives
elsewhere left the crater. In rural areas, many local communities made
their own accommodation arrangements [22].
By the evening of the 6 April, the DCP decided that they would
commence an evacuation of the crater, which they publicly announced
by radio on the morning of 7 April. The local hotel association was
contracted to arrange thousands of hotel rooms. The DCP established
information points at various places around L'Aquila where people
could obtain information about the housing options. At these in-
formation points, people who wanted to be rehoused were allocated to
locations, sometimes up to 170 kms away. Busses were available for
people who needed transport. To be assigned a hotel room, people had
to go to the police station in the town to which they were allocated.
The DCP's radio message was intended primarily as an encourage-
ment to leave. With people fearful of further earthquakes, many ac-
cepted this invitation, perhaps without regard to the consequences of
this decision. People were then forced to stay in emergency hotel ac-
commodation for periods ranging from six months to over a year,
something they did not expect and for which they were unprepared.
By the end of April, the crater population had become split between
the tent camps near L'Aquila and the hotels along the Abruzzo coast. A
local newspaper [73] reported that, of the 70,000 people displaced by
the earthquake, 65,988 were assisted by the DCP, including: 23,168
accommodated in hotels; 6,956 in private accommodation in the other
cities in Abruzzo; and 35,864 located in 170 tent camps across the
crater.
The length of time people had to stay in hotels varied, with some
being moved into the new temporary houses (from 29 September 2009
on), while others had to remain in hotel accommodation until May
2010 when sufficient housing became available. The people who had
established themselves in the tent camps were evicted in September
2009, with the government having declared during the G8 that no one
would remain in the tent camps after this date.
The cost of all this accommodation was phenomenal. The Abruzzo
Region agreed with the regional association of hotels (Federalberghi)
that the government would provide €47 per person per day [74]. One
report [75] indicated that the total cost of the hotel accommodation
was €180 million. We estimated that for the first few months after the
earthquake, the cost of hotel accommodation was over €1.2 million per
day. This was a huge financial benefit to the tourism industry, as a local
councillor explained in an interview with us in 2017:
“With the L'Aquila earthquake, hotel businesses that were usually
only open 4–5 months per year – from May/June to September/
October – instead were kept open for 24 months consecutively
hosting displaced people from L'Aquila for two years. All rooms
were full! Everyday, lunches and dinners, lunches and dinners …
For hotel managers, this was a business that wouldn't happen twice
in their life!”
The 170 tent camps required 5,643 tents, 101 field kitchens and 37
field medical centres [73]. Some tents were for 4 people, others were
for up to 15 people. Within each camp, there was an eating area,
kitchen, toilet block, and a recreational area. The DCP also provided
food and water, health care, psychological support and social activities.
The DCP directly engaged with service providers for the provision of
equipment and consumables, and paid all costs. DCP contracts for food
supply were mostly with non-local companies. Local produce was rarely
utilised. Thus local agricultural production was affected, first by the
earthquake and then by the lack of sales. Despite protest by some local
producers, even milk and bread was imported. Consequently, after
some months, the local cooperative milk factory, which was already in
financial difficulties, went bankrupt with flow-on consequences for
local farmers.
All DCP arrangements were arguably subject to state secrecy pro-
visions. As a long-serving local councillor said:
I perfectly remember the discussions we [the Council] had the first
years after the earthquake when, several times, we asked the DCP
and its Chief, Bertolaso, to provide us with financial statements or a
fair account of the money spent and decisions taken. I always heard
the same formulaic answer, that “the DCP's work is not subject to the
Presidency of the Council of Ministers' control, much less to the local
council's control”, just like in the Secret Services!
An exposé by the antimafia NGO, Libera [76]; revealed that there
was gross mismanagement in the provision of services in the tent
camps. For example, it determined that there was a surplus of around
1600 portable toilets. The cost of the tent camps was around €1 million
per day [76]. A DCP report to the European Commission indicated that
the total cost of the tent camps was €140 million and that the total cost
of all emergency assistance for the first 6 months was €430 million
[75].
The division of the population into basecamps and hotels along the
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coast created social relationship difficulties for the affected people.
People lodging in hotels said they were living as ‘earthquake victims’
(terremotato) in a place they did not feel was their own, far away from
their hometown, relatives and work. While arguably this was comfor-
table for the first few days, as the months went by, they could not hide
the discomfort, alienation and the discrimination they experienced,
especially during summer when the service they received was different
to that of the tourists staying in the hotels. Many felt as if they had been
deported.
The situation in the basecamps was also unpleasant. They were
perceived by some as being ‘concentration camps’ due to the high level
of control. Some basecamps were very rigid, run by strict military
personnel, some of which even conducted flag ceremonies twice a day.
In many cases, access was denied to non-residents, and to gain entry
inhabitants had to carry identity papers and present them on demand.
There were differences between the DCP camps and the camps led by
local communities. People living in self-organized camps in the
mountain villages felt more joyful, happy, and proud [22]. An inter-
viewee said: “We did not agree with the military management of the
basecamps because you were forced to be like you were in a military
barracks … there were a lot of people that had to control and manage
everything, and this prevented the earthquake victims from cooperating
with each other”. Another participant asked rhetorically: “How would it
be possible to help in the kitchen if there were already 20 DCP volun-
teers working there? The problem was that there were too many vo-
lunteers from outside, and even if you wanted to help, it was not pos-
sible!”
Any public meeting that local groups wanted to organize in the
camps were subject to DCP control. While there were DCP-led camp
assemblies that provided information to residents, these were top-down
information sessions, and people who made critical comments were
often harassed and intimidated. Although there were social activities
arranged by residents and by some cultural associations, around the end
of May 2009, it was decided that all cultural activities had to be au-
thorized by DCP staff. As a local councillor said:
“They were really quick to immediately censor whatever private
initiative you wanted to organize in the basecamp. For example,
even if you wanted to organize movie nights in the basecamp where
you were living, the DCP officer-in-charge would tell you to go to
DICOMAC to ask permission … If they agreed, they then took over
your initiative”.
Life in the tent camps became institutionalised and was subject to
routine, with a strict time schedule. The command-and-control ap-
proach heavily influenced people's emotions, attitudes and behaviours.
An atmosphere of fear was created, especially through the ‘jackals
alert’, which led local people to think and act as if there were enemies
about. As explained by one interviewee:
“All these restrictions of a military kind in the basecamps, such as:
getting in without leaving an identity document at the entrance was
forbidden; getting out after 10 pm was forbidden; at 10.30 pm pri-
vate tents had to be closed up. … [These restrictions] were somehow
supported by the population: people thought that it was right that
the basecamps had to be closed at 10 pm because there were ‘dan-
gers’, and then you discover that these ‘dangers’ were absolutely
fictional. For example, in one mountain suburb … in the little
basecamp of 40 tents, residents got the absurd idea of establishing
surveillance patrols to watch the basecamp at night. Thus, in a little
basecamp of 40 tents with only local people, where nothing would
go except only some wolves occasionally, at 4 am there would be a
surveillance patrol of four to five local inhabitants patrolling their
village. And this attitude, of course, was influenced by the climate
the DCP had created”.
Over time, the command-and-control approach contributed to
changing residents’ feelings, attitudes and behaviours. An interviewee
from a remote mountain village provided an interesting account. Due to
the remoteness of her village, the DCP only arrived some weeks after
the earthquake. Before they arrived, local people were self-organizing.
When the DCP arrived, something radically changed, and the commu-
nity-mindedness of the first weeks was extinguished:
“I remember that in the basecamp where I lived immediately after
the earthquake, there was a wonderful climate until the DCP ar-
rived. … There was a climate of brotherhood. But with the arrival of
the DCP assistance, everything changed. I perfectly remember the
switch that happened. I don't know, perhaps people did not feel
responsible anymore for the commons, and it began to be a rush to
get the most from the DCP, a gold rush! Instead of cooperating, they
began to look at each other with suspicion and jealousy”.
The over-assistance of the DCP not only changed local people's
feelings, attitudes and behaviours increasing their dependence, it
served to encourage acceptance of DCP's rules and plans. A sense of
totalisation was reported by one interviewee:
“[life in the tent camps] was like in a concentration camp … I mean,
they created a structure in which it was forbidden to discuss, it was
forbidden to contest, it was necessary to obey. The DCP thought
about everything: Do you want a pair of shoes? Tomorrow, the tem-
porary outlet in the basecamp would open and you could get
whatever kind of shoes you wanted. Do you want wholemeal bread?
Tomorrow, the temporary outlet in the basecamp would open and
you could get wholemeal bread. It was for free, everything was for
free! All we ask of you in return is that you must accept our rules! Then
we put in a bit of fear of the jackals, we say they can loot, and the
population obviously feels the need to be protected and empathizes
and adapts to this situation.”
Building acceptance through providing assistance and creating de-
pendency also helped build an uncritical “divinization” of the com-
mander and his heroic actions. As the local councillor told us: “I re-
member when Bertolaso begun to tour around the tent camps … to
make people feel the State's presence, he was welcomed like a hero.
People were waiting 15min in a queue to kiss his hand”.
The DCP did not contribute to enhancing social cohesion, to the
capacity of local people to autonomously build a common vision for
their own future, or to develop a shared plan for their recovery. The
vision that was mainstreamed was the DCP's vision, and the plan that
was decided upon and implemented was the plan that the DCP had
already decided to implement. The only decision the local population
had to make was to accept or oppose the DCP's plan. This created
conflict between those who agreed and those who opposed the plan. In
contrast to the building of social cohesion that is a feature of place-
based policies, inevitably the top-down imposition of plans always
creates division [49,77].
With the Italian government's battle cry that was promulgated
during the G8, “From tents to homes within 6 months!” when the 6
months were up and the temporary housing policies had failed to
achieve the targets, the DCP evicted the people living in the tent camps.
The tent residents were ordered to leave their tents for accommodation
in hotels (most around 60 kms away) or to relocate to the modular
buildings that had been established in the nearby military compound.
This forced relocation created much resentment and protest, especially
given that many people had made themselves quite at home in the tents
by furnishing them with their personal belongings from their destroyed
homes. For people sent to hotels, major concerns were the distance
from their workplace and the breakdown of their social networks.
9. Temporary housing provision: the CASE project
It was obvious from the first day that reconstruction would be a
long-term process and that a temporary housing solution would be
needed to accommodate people for some years while reconstruction
A.J. Imperiale and F. Vanclay International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 36 (2019) 101099
8
took place. While this is perhaps normal following major earthquakes,
what was surprising in the L'Aquila case was the hastiness of decision
making, the lack of community engagement, the lack of any impact
assessment or needs assessment, the nature of the solutions, how they
were implemented, and their high cost. One of the options was called
the CASE project, being an acronym for Complessi Antisismici Sostenibili
ed Ecocompatibili (i.e. anti-seismic, sustainable and eco-compatible
complexes). The concept of this project was that it would provide
temporary housing for the earthquake victims while reconstruction
occurred, but be a permanent facility to enable future use. The build-
ings were intended to be durable, sustainable, comfortable, homely,
and safe [78]. Superficially, this sounds like a good idea, but the project
was highly controversial and problematic [44,50].
The project ultimately resulted in 5,736 apartments in 185 buildings
on 19 locations, providing housing for some 15,500 people. The
European Union contributed €350 million (42% of the total cost [51],
with the remainder paid by the Italian Civil Protection Fund. The
project was conceived, approved and implemented at great speed. It
was the brainchild of Gian Michele Calvi (who incidentally was a
member of the Major Risk Commission [7], the then President and
founder of the research foundation, Eucentre, a not-for-profit organi-
sation that promotes seismic risk mitigation from an engineering per-
spective. Calvi launched the idea on the national intellectual TV talk-
show, AnnoZero, on 9 April 2009, i.e. only a few days after the
earthquake. Within one week, his idea was politically endorsed. Ordi-
nance OPCM n.3755 of 15 April allocated €300,000 to the Eucentre to
develop the idea (OPCM n.3755, art.12). A public announcement that
the DCP would proceed with Calvi's plan was made on 23 April, and
was implemented in law on 28 April (art. 2 of the law decree 39).
Construction started at the end of May and the first houses were ready
for occupation on 29 September 2009.
The L'Aquila Council was excluded from decision-making around
the CASE project and its implementation. All decisions around the
project and its locations were made by the DCP together with the
L'Aquila Mayor and two professionals the Mayor had appointed through
the use of emergency procedures. It was only by reading the local daily
newspaper that the local councillors learnt the CASE project was being
implemented. As soon as they could, the local councillors convened a
council meeting, their first formal meeting after the earthquake, with
the intention to reclaim their right to have a say in decision-making,
especially regarding the disaster management activities being carried
out by the DCP. As a local councillor explained:
“In June 2009 when we learned from the newspaper about the de-
cision concerning the CASE project, we convened the first Council
meeting after the earthquake. It was held in the presence of the DCP
Chief, Bertolaso, who had been formally invited by the council to
attend. The councillors who convened the meeting had the objective
to say to Bertolaso: Look, there is a local council! The management of
the territory should not be taken away from the council. There were
many local committees being established and claiming that the city
should have a say in the decision making process, especially about
the temporary housing solutions in general, and the CASE project
and its locations in particular. However, Bertolaso did not come to
hear this, he came to the council meeting only to tell us about what
he did, what he was doing, and what he was going to do. His
message was clear, his communication was efficient. There was no
possibility for the local council to discuss and decide with the DCP,
or even to be heard about what local people's needs and perspectives
were, not at all! To summarise, Bertolaso came to that meeting with
an attitude of: I decide, I command, and I am now kindly informing
you about what I have already decided to do in the coming weeks”.
The local councillors convened a second council meeting in August
in order to have a say about the allocation criteria for the CASE
apartments, but again with no result. As the local councillor explained:
“In August, …we convened the second council meeting with the
objective to discuss the allocation criteria in order to decide about
the families who would be accommodated [in the CASE project] …
However, the Council's final resolution was discarded by the DCP.
We never did find out why. First, they had an algorithm called
‘Corallo’, then one called ‘Bizantino’ for the selection of bene-
ficiaries. When we asked the DCP through a formal freedom-of-in-
formation request what the allocation criteria adopted by the DCP
were, Bertolaso answered me verbatim, once again: The DCP's work
is autonomous, from the Presidency of the Council of Ministers' control,
even more so from the L'Aquila Council, therefore we do not need to
provide you any document with criteria”.
The CASE buildings had anti-seismic foundations, using seismic
isolators and cement 525 (a kind of cement normally used for dams).
The massive size of these foundations was criticized as being excessive
in relation to the comparative light-weight nature of the buildings [79].
Despite the over-engineering, many of the isolators turned out to be
faulty. Given concerns about potential mafia involvement and misuse of
public funds, there was some monitoring of contracts, which led to
some isolators being tested and found to be faulty:
“On request of the Aquila Prosecutor's office, the seismic isolators
were tested by a laboratory in San Diego (California). The seismic
isolators produced by the company ALGA Spa failed the test. The
seismic isolators had previously been tested by the laboratory
Eucenter of Pavia G. Calvi. Mr. Calvi was also the director of CASE
in the DPC. Hence, this is a classic case of controlled-controller and
of conflict of interests.” [51]; p.9, sic, errors in original)
There were also other concerns with the CASE project. Works to the
value of €560 million were commissioned by directly engaging con-
tractors rather than going through formal public tenders [80]. Several
building firms linked to the mafia were appointed [51,76]. The cost of
the CASE project was excessive. However, establishing the exact costs is
very difficult, with inconsistent reporting across sources. The European
Court of Audits [81] reported that the total cost was €597 million,
equivalent to over €1,648 per square metre. This would be 158% more
than normal market cost for a prefabricated apartment [81].
Søndergaard [51] reported that the total cost was €809 million. In an
official report about the costs of post-disaster interventions, the Italian
Minister for Territorial Cohesion from 2011 to 2013, Fabrizio Barca,
indicated that the total cost was €833 million [82].
The CASE project transformed the landscape. Most CASE buildings
were built in mountainous and rural areas around L'Aquila City,
creating urban sprawl, some in clear contradiction to the European
Landscape Convention [99,105]. In some cases, the buildings were
erected near farms creating hygiene issues and conflict between farmers
and the new residents. Land for the buildings was expropriated, causing
much resentment and ill-feeling amongst the original landowners and
conflict because of differences in compensation and perceptions of
fairness. Some 6,000 land parcels were expropriated, including over
100 ha of farmland, causing irreversible damage to local agriculture
[48,100]. No rural livelihood restoration plan was implemented. Al-
though owners of urban land allotments were compensated adequately,
it was reported to us that some farmers were not satisfied with the
compensation amounts and/or that they experienced delays in being
paid.
Some CASE buildings were not connected to the sewerage system
and discharged raw sewage from approximately 3,500 people directly
into the Aterno, Vera and Raiale rivers [44,83]. This created impacts for
water quality, local agricultural production, and on local people's
health [84,85].
Implementation of the CASE project began before any needs as-
sessment was conducted. The implication of this was that, even though
they were originally planning to construct around 4,000 apartments, it
was later established that this was nowhere near enough, catering for
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less than one third of the displaced population. Another 1,700 apart-
ments were then added to the plan. A survey concerning housing needs
was only conducted in August 2009, well after all temporary housing
solutions were already being implemented. The survey sought to
identify the needs and preferences of people concerning the various
accommodation options: including several temporary housing projects;
apartments rented by the State; and State contributions to autonomous
accommodation. The survey revealed that the CASE project was in-
sufficient and that 8,000 people would have to continue to live in hotels
until other housing solutions would be ready [86]. Because other forms
of transitional housing (e.g. prefabs, container homes, caravans) were
not considered, the CASE project had the consequence of prolonging
people's stay in emergency accommodation.
There was much concern about how the locations for the CASE
buildings were selected [105]. The locations were primarily chosen by
the two technicians appointed by the L'Aquila Mayor. Given the lack of
input into location decisions by other stakeholders, it is not surprising
that many problems arose with the locations selected. We were told by
various professionals that the locations were inappropriate because: (1)
the buildings were not close to shopping centres and other public fa-
cilities; (2) they created transport problems by shifting the loci of po-
pulations creating traffic bottlenecks because of changes in traffic flows;
(3) public transport routes became over-extended; (4) the supply of
electricity, gas, water and sewerage was problematic because of the
shift in population centres; and (5) the potential future reuse of the
buildings was limited because they were not close to public institutions
like the university or the hospital.
The allocation criteria used to select people for CASE apartments
were not transparent. There was no attempt to preserve previous
neighbourhood relationships and the social disintegration produced by
the emergency accommodation was exacerbated. Due to the lack of
stated criteria, many people had a sense of injustice. The majority of
people did not like living in the CASE apartments and experienced
feelings of anomie, homelessness, loss of sense of place, and depression
[106]. People described life in the CASE buildings as living in a per-
manent state of temporariness, living in a cemetery, in a shoe box, or in
impersonal apartments all in a row.
The dis-functioning of the CASE buildings has been regularly re-
ported in various media sources. Of particular note was the collapsing
of balconies in several buildings, with potential risk to occupants. In
2014, the use of the balconies in 800 apartments was banned [87].
Consequently, a court case was commenced in 2017 against 37 builders
(ongoing at the time of writing). Other reported problems include: the
poor quality of construction materials; leaking pipes and water seepage;
numerous deficiencies creating dangerous situations; fires due to faulty
electric systems; and the improper use of flammable materials [51].
Construction deficiencies in some buildings were so great that between
April and December 2013 residents submitted 1,200 requests for
maintenance [88]. To date, 500 apartments have been declared unfit
for habitation, and several buildings will be demolished [89]. In one
mountain community, Arischia, construction of its buildings was so
poor that in 2015 all residents had to be relocated elsewhere, leading to
hardship, stress, and psychological trauma [90]. In 2017, a further 70
families in L'Aquila had to be relocated [91].
Despite claiming to be sustainable and eco-compatible, the CASE
apartments had many shortcomings, not only in construction but also in
energy use. The DCP initially paid the bills for energy and water. From
March 2010, the L'Aquila municipality had to pay these costs. For
various reasons, including an upcoming election, the Mayor neglected
to act on the bills received, thus accumulating a massive debt for the
municipality. In 2011, the electricity provider, Enel, considered the
municipality to be in arrears and increased the unit cost of electricity as
a penalty and to cover the increased risk. After the 2012 election, the
municipality issued bills for past consumption to all inhabitants, with
some individual bills exceeding €5,500. There was a huge protest by
residents regarding the lack of transparency in the billing
arrangements, and the unjust way in which the bills were calculated
[92].
Although originally called an ‘Italian Miracle’ [48], the CASE pro-
ject was a disaster in its own right. This project was not based on any
community needs assessment and did not reflect the actual housing
demand. The CASE buildings were realised without any consideration
of environmental or social impacts or their future sustainability. Thus,
far from being a temporary housing solution, the CASE project became
a permanent liability for the local communities who have to carry the
burden of its environmental, health and social impacts. Within 10 years
of their construction, some 10% of the CASE buildings have been de-
clared unsafe. On 10 June 2017, the outgoing local Mayor, Massimo
Cialente, who in the beginning agreed with the DCP plan, declared that
it was better to demolish all the CASE buildings due to their high
maintenance costs and structural deficiencies. There has been ongoing
discussion of this idea [89].
10. Comparing the command-and-control approach in L’Aquila
against international principles
In the stories above, we highlighted how emergency powers were
used, how the command-and-control approach was applied, and how
top-down planning was implemented by the DCP in the post-disaster
response and recovery in L'Aquila, specifically in relation to the control
of looting (jackals), the implementation of restricted areas (red zones),
and in the provision of emergency shelter and temporary housing (the
CASE project). We argue that it is reasonable to expect that the Italian
DCP should have been familiar and complied with international DRR
principles and guidelines that were applicable at that time. Therefore, it
is appropriate to assess their recovery operations against the DRR
paradigm, and specifically against the principles highlighted in the
UNDRO report, Shelter After Disaster: Guidelines for Assistance [4], which
we outlined at the beginning of our paper (see Table 1). Based on our
analysis, it is obvious that none of the principles were respected in the
L'Aquila situation (see Table 2).
The UNDRO [4] report was partly based on an analysis of the 1976
Guatemala earthquake. It identified many mistakes in how disaster
response and recovery were implemented. Sadly, all the mistakes
mentioned in the 1982 UNDRO report were repeated in L'Aquila in
2009. Specifically:
• too much aid was given, mostly to the detriment of local people;• too many of the houses constructed were of an emergency or tem-
porary type, with little consideration given to the reconstruction of
local people's houses;• large numbers of external volunteers were used, leading to a sense of
invasion, and supressing the ability of local people to enact their
own resilience;• too much was done under the guise of time pressure, without proper
consultation with local people. This meant that the affected people
became mere spectators of the work carried out rather than parti-
cipants in the process of recovery and reconstruction. It also meant
that many of the interventions were a complete failure and/or to-
tally inadequate for local needs;• a lot of work was undertaken without involving local people, which
meant that opportunities for re-development were lost, many local
businesses became bankrupt, and people felt excluded.
Instead of being informed by international DRR guidelines, Italian
disaster management is informed by its Augustus Method [18], which
embodies the command-and-control approach, and advocates that the
commander-in-charge needs to formulate a disaster management plan
that should be strongly communicated and quickly implemented. The
Augustus Method also describes how community acquiescence must be
acquired to create obedience and thwart unwanted behaviour from the
affected people [22]. Being focussed only on how the plan is to be
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executed, the Augustus Method and the command-and-control ap-
proach do not even consider that response and recovery actions might
create social and environmental impacts, or violate human rights. Nor
do they reflect on how response and recovery interventions can con-
tribute to reducing vulnerability and disaster risk, or enhance local
community resilience. In the Augustus Method, there is no reference to
community resilience, the DRR paradigm, or the United Nations dis-
aster management principles (despite the UNDRO report having been
published in 1982). It is also surprising that it has not since been up-
dated.
The Augustus Method and the command-and-control approach are
ridden with false assumptions, myths and misconceptions that hinder
proper understanding of the social dimensions of disaster[22,26]. These
assumptions can be grouped into two sets. The first set concerns local
affected communities: they are shocked victims who need assistance;
recovery operations are complicated and local people do not have
knowledge or capacities to contribute usefully; they are inclined to
panic; any initiatives they take and any spontaneous behaviour are a
potential threat to themselves and to the proper functioning of post-
disaster operations; there will be lawlessness and looters; and people
will abandon their public responsibilities and duties in favour of per-
sonal interests. All up, the people in the disaster zone must be carefully
controlled and kept out of the way. The second set concerns time
pressure: time in post-disaster operations is a matter of life and death,
and, therefore, the quicker, the better; consideration of social and en-
vironmental impacts is a waste of precious time; the involvement of the
public is time-consuming and pointless; normal laws, governance
oversight and local democracy retard emergency operations; and to be
efficient there needs to be a single ‘man in charge’ who has authority to
make quick decisions.
In L'Aquila, the playing-out of these disaster myths was highly
evident in the mainstream media and in the way the DCP conducted its
operations. The DCP clearly held onto the disaster myths, acted as if
they were real, promulgated them in order to justify its interventions,
and manipulatively used them in order to advance disaster capitalism at
national and local levels. The jackals alert created a climate of fear and
Table 2
The extent to which international disaster management principles were followed after the L'Aquila earthquake.
Principle Review of the extent to which the principle was applied
1. Avoid anything best undertaken by survivors themselves. INADEQUATE. In L'Aquila, emergency shelters were provided by relying on a massive amount
of external resources both for the hotel and tent camp solutions. No initial assessment was
conducted to consider the accommodation needs of affected local people or their capacity to
autonomously find refuge. The management of the tent camps relied on a large number of
external volunteers, whose efforts tended to suppress the involvement of local people.
2. Support and strengthen local governance and capacities. INADEQUATE. Through the declaration of the State of Emergency, some local leaders were
given emergency powers. However, this did not strengthen local governance. By giving
emergency powers to them, local governance, which was already weak, was made worse,
corruption arose, and local community participation was completely absent.
3. The assessment of human needs is more important than any damage assessment. INADEQUATE. Damage assessment of public and private buildings began immediately.
However, a community needs assessment was only conducted in August.
4. The compulsory evacuation of survivors should be avoided. INADEQUATE. Although the DCP evacuation policy was allegedly only an encouragement for
people to leave the crater, essentially it was compulsory in that anyone who left could not
return because of delays in providing temporary housing and the lack of alternatives. Later,
there were forced evictions when the government decided to close down the tent camps.
5. Local content in building emergency shelters should be encouraged. INADEQUATE. There was only limited utilisation of local content, all of which was of dubious
appropriateness, and was subject to elite capture, rent-seeking and misuse of funds.
6. Reconstruction of damaged buildings should be a priority rather than a focus only
on temporary solutions.
INADEQUATE. There was a strong focus on temporary solutions, which obscured any ability to
start reconstruction of people's houses. Where reconstruction of buildings had commenced in
the city centres, it was primarily on buildings with cultural heritage value rather than ordinary
people's houses. Furthermore the temporary solutions consumed most of the available funding
to the tune of billions of euros.
7. Preparedness is crucial to reduce post-disaster impacts. INADEQUATE. There was no evidence of any preparedness even despite the earthquake swarm
affecting the area since October 2008.
8. Reconstruction is an opportunity for risk reduction and reform. INADEQUATE. In the planning for reconstruction (which has largely not yet commenced) there
has been very little consideration of building-in DRR. The temporary housing (CASE project)
was intended to be sustainable and earthquake resistant, however this project was very poorly
implemented and arguably its alleged positive features were little more than rent-seeking.
9. The relocation of communities, whether temporary or permanent, should be
avoided.
INADEQUATE. People were relocated vast distances, with communities being fragmented. No
attempt was made to allow social networks to be relocated together. For some villages, this
resulted in total social disintegration, the destruction of village life, alienation and a loss of
their sense of place.
10. Success in reconstruction is closely linked to issues of land tenure, government
land policy, and all aspects of land-use and infrastructure planning.
INADEQUATE. Government ordinances became a means for overriding the ordinary regulatory
framework for land use and infrastructure planning. The emergency powers were used to
subvert good planning practice and policies.
11. Cash donations and the creation of dependency should be avoided. COMPLEX. In Italy, people do not privately insure their houses and there is a social expectation
that any loss is covered by the State. Thus, this principle is difficult to apply. However, the state
solicited cash donations from the public, private sector and from other nations. This fund was
badly managed. Furthermore, some of the collected monies were dispersed as loans with an
interest of 4%, which created resentment among local people and many donors felt cheated.
12. Avoid raising the expectations of the affected local communities. INADEQUATE. Local people's expectations were raised and not met in many ways, especially in
relation to the reconstruction process. What was framed as reconstruction actually was either
the construction of temporary housing or temporary safety measures. The hosting of the G8
also led to raising expectations with promises made by many countries not being met.
13. The success of post-disaster interventions strictly depends on accountability and
the participation of local people.
INADEQUATE. The arrangements established by the authorities abused emergency power
provisions normally understood around the world. State secrecy was used to avoid
accountability and transparency. No attempt was made to allow for the participation of local
people. Decision making was centralised, and local governance arrangements were
overthrown.
14. Guidelines should be developed at the local level, by local people, modelled on
international guidelines.
INADEQUATE. Italy seems to be unaware of international understandings of DRR. There were
no local guidelines.
A.J. Imperiale and F. Vanclay International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 36 (2019) 101099
11
suspicion, rather than empathy. The local population was framed as
shocked and unable to cope, which led to over-assistance and patern-
alism creating rent-seeking opportunities and a gold rush, rather than
promulgating social responsibility. The idea that people had nothing to
contribute because recovery operations were perceived as being just
technical facilitated elite capture rather than cooperation and capacity
building. The State Funeral and other commemorative rites (e.g. those
in front of the student dormitory where 8 students died) were seized
upon as opportunities to be orchestrated for mediatization and the
outpouring of feigned grief [93]. They were hijacked to build the ap-
proval of the commander-in-charge, rather than to build trust and co-
hesion in the community. The militarization of the emergency area and
the creation of red zones contributed to exclusion, homelessness,
powerlessness, and social disarticulation. The DCP paraded their in-
terventions with extensive propaganda, leading to the divinization of
the DCP chief, and to building uncritical consent for its disaster man-
agement plan. Shortly after the earthquake, a plan for the provision of
temporary housing (the CASE project) was designed and implemented
without any engagement of the local affected population. The hastiness
of its implementation was justified by the alleged need to act quickly.
There was no consideration of environmental or social impacts and
human rights issues, or concern for proper governance. All up, the re-
covery operations carried out during the State of Emergency, which
lasted three years, represented a second disaster for local people.
In the stories we analyse in this paper, it was evident that the DCP's
interventions during the response and recovery stages were im-
plemented using specific institutional arrangements: the command-and-
control approach, emergency powers, and top-down planning. Use of
these arrangements was justified as being an efficient means to avoid
delay in the implementation of post-disaster interventions. However,
these arrangements were highly vulnerable to elite capture, and al-
lowed implementation of recovery interventions without considering
the needs or priorities of the local communities, or any systematic
community resilience-building strategy [107]. However, rather than
efficiency, there were delays, wastage and massive social and en-
vironmental impacts. The post-disaster operations led to very poor
outcomes in the short, medium and long term. They were opportunities
for rent-seeking and elite capture by external suppliers and influential
building firms, which led to over-engineered solutions reflecting their
interests rather than the needs of affected local people. Although
around €22 billion was spent on post-disaster interventions in the
L'Aquila crater [94], ten years after the earthquake, the red zones still
exist, and over 10,000 people still live in temporary accommodation.
11. Conclusion
The international DRR paradigm, which is supported by several
United Nations agreements, spells out the key principles that should be
followed in disaster management. It advocates for a community em-
powerment approach to disaster management and development, in
which the capacities of local communities to manage disaster risk, learn
from past failures, reduce vulnerability, and enhance resilience are
strengthened. In this paradigm, disaster management must not only be
the business of the commander, it is primarily the business of local
communities who suffer the negative social impacts of disasters. Local
people must be engaged and empowered in every phase of disaster
management so that they can better manage disaster risks and impacts,
and enhance their resilience and wellbeing.
Rather than compliance with the international DRR paradigm, the
disaster management practice of the DCP in the aftermath of the
L'Aquila earthquake reflected a command-and-control approach.
Although the command-and-control approach was widely rebuked well
before the 2009 earthquake, the Italian DCP claimed the approach was
effective and kept on applying it. The command-and-control approach
together with the promulgation of disaster myths, the use of emergency
powers and the implementation of top-down planning, constituted the
mechanism through which the DCP implemented its disaster manage-
ment operations.
The promulgation of the disaster myths by the DCP undermined
their and wider community understanding of the social dimensions of
disaster. The use of the command-and-control approach led to elite
capture, which undermined recognition of local community needs,
priorities and desires. The implementation of top-down planning did
not take into account the social and environmental impacts created by
the planned interventions, nor their mid to long-term sustainability. It
was negatively influenced by rent-seeking and over-engineered solu-
tions, and undermined any effective engagement of local people in the
design and implementation of recovery operations. Finally, the emer-
gency powers granted by the state allowed post-disaster interventions
to be carried out in the suspension of normal laws of democratic gov-
ernance, and in the absence of transparency, accountability or proper
public procurement procedures. Overall, the promulgation of disaster
myths, the command-and-control approach, top-down planning, and
the use of emergency powers were the belief system and institutional
arrangements that constituted the mechanism through which the DCP's
disaster management operations resoundingly failed to meet interna-
tional principles of disaster management.
Many questions are raised by this paper. Why is there ignorance of
United Nations recommendations and the international DRR paradigm?
Why does the command-and-control approach have such a strong
foothold in disaster management agencies? How can the disaster myths
be countered? How can a better understanding of the social dimensions
of disaster be mainstreamed in disaster management practice? How can
disaster management agencies become more willing to accept bottom-
up and participatory approaches? How can community resilience be
harnessed in post-disaster operations?
In post-disaster situations, there are no enemies to defeat, and only
in emergency rescue activities is time truly a matter of life and death.
Even in rescue situations, the best way to implement effective action is
by engaging and supporting local people already helping their family,
friends or neighbours trapped in the rubble. There is no justification for
disaster management practice to be conducted on the basis of a com-
mand-and-control approach and not be accountable, transparent, re-
flect the needs and priorities of local communities, or to carefully
consider the social and environmental impacts and human rights con-
cerns associated with post-disaster interventions. Alternatives to com-
mand-and-control must be developed to enable empowerment of local
affected communities, enhancement of their wellbeing and resilience,
and to respect international DRR principles.
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